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NOTES
CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTORS
Congress has established a universal military training pro-
gram,' thereby departing from a traditional policy of resorting to
consciption only in times of war or periods of national emergency.
As a consequence, if the litigious experience of World War II is
any indication, the problem of the conscientious objector to military
service will continue to confront the courts and lawyers. Presently,
no conscientious objector is subject to combatant military service.2
But before such status is attained, the individual claiming to be a
conscientious objector must run the gamut of the administrative
procedure set up to determine his good faith. 3 Since the 1948 Act,
1. Universal Military Training and Service Act of 1951, Pub. L. No.
51, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. (June 19, 1951).
2. 62 Stat. 612 (1948), 50 U. S. C. A. App. § 456(j) (Supp. 1951).
3. 62 Stat. 613 (1948), 50 U. S. C. A. App. § 456(j) (Supp. 1951) ; 32
Code Fed. Regs. §§ 1624-1627 (1949), as amended by Exec. Order No.
10292, 16 Fed. Reg. 9853 (1951). The Administrative Procedure Act is not
applicable, 62 Stat. 623 (1948), 50 U. S. C. A. App. § 463(b) (Supp. 1951).
Because of its inherent nature, the issue of good faith will not be covered in
this Note.
MARITAL DEDUCTION
the individual must satisfy a stricter religious test than formerly
to be classified a conscientious objector.4 It is the purpose of this
Note to survey the problem of religious requirements, after a de-
scription of the administrative procedure involved.
I. ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE
At the time directed by the president, the individual claiming
to be a conscientious objector is under a legal duty to present him-
self at his local draft board for registration.5 The local board is the
first to consider the objector's claim, and it may6 make the classi-
fication of conscientious objector (1-0) or of conscientious objector
available for non-combatant service (I-A-O) .7 The latter classifica-
tion will subject the objector to perform military service, but not
combat duties." The former classification entitled the objector to
complete exemption from any service under the 1948 Act9 but now
compels him to perform service of national importance in civilian
work camps operated by Selective Service,10 as during World War
II.11 If the objector's claim is not sustained by the local board and
he is classified either as available for military service (I-A) or as a
4. 62 Stat. 612 (1948), 50 U. S. C. A. App. § 456(j) (Supp. 1951).
See Resolution of the National Student Association (a national association of
university student councils) in their 4th Annual Congress at Minneapolis,
Minnesota, August 29, 1951: "The Congress urges recognition of conscien-
tious objectors on religious and humanitarian grounds as opposed to the
draft law of 1951." See notes 54-57 infra, for discussion of the former test.
5. 62 Stat. 605 (1948), 50 U. S. C. A. App. § 453 (Supp. 1951).
6. 32 Code Fed. Regs. § 1622.1(c), as amended by Exec. Order No.
10292, 16 Fed. Reg. 9848 (1951).
7. 32 Code Fed. Regs. § 1622.11, as amended by Exec. Order No.
10292, 16 Fed. Reg. 9848 (1951) (Class I-A-O); 32 Code Fed. Regs. §
1622.14, as amended by Exec. O:rder No. 10292, 16 Fed. Reg. 9849 (1951)
(Class 1-0).
8. 62 Stat. 612 (1948), 50 U. S. C. A. App. § 456(j) (Supp. 1951);
32 Code Fed. Regs. § 1622.11. as amended by Exec. Order No. 10292, 16
Fed. Reg. 9848 (1951). Exec. Order No. 10028, 14 Fed. Reg. 211 (1949)
defines non-combatant duty: ". . . The term 'non-combatant service' shall
mean (a) service in any unit of the armed forces which is unarmed at all
times; (b) service in the medical department of any of the armed forces,
wherever performed; or (c) any other assignment the primary function of
which does not require the use of arms in combat; provided that such other
assignment is acceptable to the individual concerned and does not require him
to bear arms or to be trained in their use."
9. 62 Stat. 612 (1948), 50 U. S. C. A. App. § 456(j) (Supp. 1951) ; 32
Code Fed. Regs. § 1622.20 (1949).
10. Pub. L. No. 51, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. § l(q) (June 19, 1951).
While serving in civilian work of national importance, the objector is
classified I-W. After 24 months of service, the objector will be released
and classified I-W Rel. See 32 Code Fed. Regs. § 1622.16, as amended by
Exec. Order No. 10292, 16 Fed. Reg. 9850 (1951).
11. 54 Stat. 889 (1940), 50 'U. S. C. § 305(g) (1946).
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conscientious objector available for non-combatant service, he has
ten days to appeal to the state selective service board to request the
1-0 classification.1 2 On this appeal, the objector's claim is referred
to a hearing officer appointed by the Justice Department,' 3 who
has available to him a secret investigatory report made by the
F.B.I.' The state appeal board may accept or reject the decision
of the hearing officer.' 5 If there is a-dissenting vote in the state
board's decision'6 or if the board will certify an appeal,1 7 the objector
may appeal an adverse decision to the president. The president may
delegate the power of review to -the Director of Selective Service.' s
After this appeal, or if no appeal to the president is allowed, the
administrative process is complete except for the physical exami-
nation. During World War II the administrative process was not
completed until the objector had passed a physical examination
which was given in conjunction with induction ceremony.19 Now
the physical examination is given before the selectee receives his
order to report for induction.20 If the selectee is physically accept-
able to the Army, he is under a duty to report for induction.
2 1
At this point an objector wishing to contest the administrative
decision has two possible avenues of procedure in the courts. First
he may bring habeas corpus against the military authorities after
induction, 22 and second he may refuse to report for induction and
stand trial for the crime of failure to comply with the order to report
for induction.23 Either course would give the federal district court
power to decide the constitutionality of the conscription act and to
12. 32 Code Fed. Regs. § 1626.2(c) (1) (1949).
13. 62 Stat. 613 (1948), 50 U. S. C. A. App. § 456(j) (Supp. 1951) ;
32 Code Fed. Regs. § 1626.25 (1949).
14. See United States v. Downer, 135 F. 2d 521, 523 (2d Cir. 1943).
15. 62 Stat. 613 (1948), 50 U. S. C. A. App. § 456(j) (Supp. 1951) ;
32 Code Fed. Regs. § 1626.25(d) (1949). See Bowles v. United States, 319
U. S. 33 (1943).
16. 32 Code Fed. Regs. § 1627.3 (1949).
17. 32 Code Fed. Regs. § 1627.1 (1949).
18. 62 Stat. 621 (1948), 50 U. S. C. A. App. § 460(c) (Supp. 1951).
Such was in fact done during World War II: Exec. Order No. 9410, 8 Fed.
Reg. 17319 (1943). But see Giese v. United States, 143 F. 2d 633, 636 (D.C.
Cir. 1944) (dissenting opinion), aff'd per curiam by an equally divided
court, 323 U. S. 682 (1945).
19. Falbo v. United States, 320 U. S. 549 (1944). Cf. Billings v.
Truesdell, 321 U. S. 542 (1944), 28 Minn. L. Rev. 334.
20. 32 Code Fed. Regs. § 162,.10 (1949). Cf. 32 Code Fed. Regs. §
1632.5(2) (1949).
21. 32 Code Fed. Regs. § 1632.14 (1949).
22. United States v. Downer, 135 F. 2d 521 (2d Cir. 1943).
23. Gibson v. United States, 329 U. S. 338 (1946) ; Estep v. United
States, 327 U. S. 114 (1946), 31 'Minn. L. Rev. 286 (1947).
19511
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
review the question of whether there was any basis in fact for the
administrative decision .
2
Resort to habeas corpus has been the historical method to secure
review of the inductee's grievances. 25 During World War I, when
all selectees were under military jurisdiction as of receipt of notice
to report for induction,26 and the conscientious objector had no
alternative to non-combatant military service,27 the objector could
not secure review of his classification or test the constitutionality of
the act except by habeas corpus. If the objector was sincere in his
protestations he usually refused to accept military discipline after
induction,28 thereby subjecting himself to the harsh provisions of
martial law. To escape military punishment, the objector sought
to secure review by the courts before induction."0 During Vorld
War II, all breaches of duties created under the Selective Service
Act were made non-military crimes 31 to be tried in the district
courts prior to induction, the maximum penalty being five years
in prison and/or a $10,000 fine. 2 However, review of the selective
service classification could not be obtained in criminal proceedings
for failure to obey pre-induction orders.-- The sole remedy was
24. See Gibson v. United States, 329 U. S. 338 (1946) (refusal to re-
port for induction) ; United States v. Cain, 144 F. 2d 944 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 323 U. S. 795 (1944) (habeas corpus-any evidence to support the
board's finding). See United States v. Estep, 327 U. S. 114, 122 (1946) (no
basis in fact); United States v. Mansavage, 178 F. 2d 812, 818 (7th Cir.
1949), cert. denied, 339 U. S. 931 (1950) (if no basis in fact).
25. See Arbitman v. Woodside, 258 Fed. 441 (4th Cir. 1919) ; McCall's
Case, 15 Fed. Cas. 1225, No. 8,669 (E.D. Pa. 1863) ; State in re Emerson,
39 Ala. 437 (1864) ; Lanahan v. Birge, 30 Conn. 438 (1862) ; Camfield v.
Patterson, 33 Ga. 561 (1863) ; E.r parte Turman, 26 Tex. 708 (1863). But
see Kneedler v. Lane, 45 Pa. 238 (1863) (injunction).
26. United States v. Drum, 107 F. 2d 897 (2d Cir. 1939). cert. denied,
310 U. S. 648 (1940) ; Franke v. Murray, 248 Fed. 865 (8th Cir. 1918).
But cf. Patterson v. Lamb, 329 U. S. 539 (1947).
27. 40 Stat. 78 (1917).
28. See examples of such conduct discussed in Thomas, The Con-
scientious Objector in America cc. VIII & IX (1923); Hayes, Challenge
of Conscience c. 8 (1949) (English conscientious objector problems).
29. See Keefe and Moskin, Codified Military Injustice, 35 CorneU L. Q.
151 (1949).
30. See Angelus v. Sullivan, 246 Fed. 54 (2d Cir. 1917) (injunction);
United States v. Kinkead, 250 Fed. 692 (3d Cir. 1918) (habeas corpus
against the draft board)
31. 54 Stat. 895 (1940), 50 U. S. C. § 311 (1946).
32. Ibid.
33. Falbo v. United States, 320 U. S. 549 (1944) ; Goodrich v. United
States, 146 F. 2d 265 (5th Cir. 1944), United States v. Nelson, 143 F. 2d
584 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U. S. 750 (1944); Bronemann v. United
States, 138 F. 2d 333 (8th Cir. :1943); United States v. Mroz, 136 F. 2d
221 (7th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 320 U. S. 805 (1943); United States v.
Kauten, 133 F. 2d 703 (2d Cir. 1943), discussed in Waite, Sectiont 5(g) of
the Selective Ser-ice Act, as Amended by the Court. 29 Minn. L. Rev. 22-25
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habeas corpus after induction. This remedy afforded the objector
an almost impossible choice, for submission to military authority
would foreclose review by habeas corpus- and unsuccessful re-
view would leave him confronted with a court-martial for not sub-
mitting to military authority. Faced with the choice of five years in a
civilian prison without opportunity for a review of his classification,
as opposed to military detention barracks if his review were un-
successful, most objectors so situated chose civilian prisons or fol-
lowed advice3" to attempt to get judicial review without being
inducted.
The rule that the objector may have review of his classification
at his trial for refusal to report for induction was not evolved by
the Supreme Court until the latter part of World War II. In Falbo v.
United States,3 7 a prosecution for failure to report for physical
examination and induction, the Court refused to allow any review
of the administrative decision, declining to interfere with the orderly
process of men into the armed forces, the administrative process
remaining incomplete. Mr. Justice Murphy dissented,38 pointing
out that the orderly process was already seriously interrupted when
the selectee had refused to report for induction, so there was no
practical reason why judicial review should not be given at that
juncture.-" The Falbo case was universally construed as denying
any review of classification in a criminal trial.40 The case of Billings
(1944); United States v. Grieme, 128 F. 2d 811 (3d Cir. 1942). The
classification could not be tested by a declaratory judgment, Meredith v.
Carter, 49 F. Supp. 899 (N.D. Ind. 1943) ; nor by habeas corpus against a
United States Marshal while awaiting trial for refusal to report for in-
ductit,ii. United States v. McGinnis, 146 F. 2d 851 (4th Cir. 1944) ; Albert
v. Goguen, 141 F. 2d 302 (1st Cir. 1944) ; nor by habeas corpus against the
draft board, Biron v. Collins, 145 F. 2d 758 (5th Cir. 1944) ; nor by writ
of certiorari or injunction against the draft board, Drumheller v. Berks
Co:unty Local Bd., 130 F. 2d 610 (3d Cir. 1942). See H. R. Rep. No. 36,
79th Cong., Ist Sess. 4-5 (1945). But see United States v. Messersmith, 138 F.
2d 599, 602 (7th Cir. 1943).
34. United States v. Downer, 135 F. 2d 591 (2d Cir. 1943).
35. See Estep v. United States, 327 U. S. 114, 130 (1946) (dilemma
posed by ,Murphy, J., concurring). See United States v. Mellis, 59 F. Supp.
682 M.D. N.C. 1945).
3(,. See Cornell, Conscience and the State 61-71 (1944).
37. 320 U. S. 549 (1944).
38. Id. at 555.
39. See Baxley v. United States, 134 F. 2d 998, 999 (4th Cir. 1943).
Sec Bell, Selective Service and the Courts, 28 A. B. A. J. 164, 167 (1942).
40. See Estep v. United States, 327 U. S. 114, 138 (1946) (concurring
opinion of Frankfurter, J.) and cases cited at 139. See Cox v. United States,
332 U. S. 442, 445 (1947) ("At that time the lower federal courts inter-
preted Falbo . . . as meaning that no judicial review of any sort could be had
of a selective service order."). See 57 Harv. L. Rev. 577 (1944).
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v. Truesdell41 distinguished the Falbo rule, holding that submitting
to the pre-induction physical did not place the objector under mili-
tary jurisdiction. In Estep v. United States,4" the Court approached
the views of Mr. Justice Murphy and completed the evolution,
allowing review of the classification in a criminal trial, where the
objector had submitted to the physical examination but not induc-
tion. After World War II, alteration of the selective service regu-
lations43 averted the possibility of the Falbo situation recurring,
and the case of the Gibson v. United States" reaffirnied the hold-
ing that judicial review is available upon refusal to report for
induction.
The Gibson and Estep cases found limited judicial review of the
administrative decision possible despite the provision in the Selec-
tive Service Act of 1940 that such a decision should be final.45 The
word "final" has indefinite meaning, depending upon the administra-
tive body involved, although the use of that word has cut off judicial
review of the decisions of some administrative bodies. 46 However,
since the 1948 Act retains the same terminology,47 it would seem
that Congress did not intend to curtail the review of selective
service classifications.
II. THE "SUPREME BEING" CLAUSE
The devices used to determine who should qualify as a con-
scientious objector have a disgraceful history, but have gradually
been improved by Congress in each succeeding war. Before the
problem became a federal one in the Civil War,4 8 the states had
encountered the problem of the conscientious objector. Early state
constitutions and laws made exemptions for conscientious objectors
who belonged to some well-recognized sects and who paid a small
fine or tax for the privilege. 4" The Civil War act had indirect pro-
visions for the conscientious objector, who could qualify under a
general provision exempting all those from service who co,'d pro-
cure a substitute or pay a $300 penalty.50 The Confederate counter-
41. 321 U. S. 542 (1944), 28 Minn. L. Rev. 334.
42. 327 U. S. 114 (1946), 31 Minn. L. Rev. 286 (1947).
43. 9 Fed. Reg. 1415 (1944) (providing for physical examination prio.r
to induction).
44. 329 U. S. 338 (1946).
45. 54 Stat. 893 (1940).
46. See Davis, Administrative Law 832-838 (1951).
47. 62 Stat. 620 (1948), 50 U. S. C. A. App. § 460(b) (3) (Supp.
1951).
48. For a general discussion of conscientious objectors in the Civil War,
see Wright, Conscientious Objectors in the Civil War (1931).
49. See Note, 27 Wash. U. L. Q. 565, 567 (1942).
50. 12 Stat. 733 (1863).
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part allowed for substitution only,5 1 but was retracted when the
fortunes of war turned against the South? 2 The substitution device
was not used in the World War I conscription act,53 which required
service of all able men on an equal basis. The conscientious objector
was allowed non-combatant service if he could establish his mem-
bership in a "well-recognized religious sect" which was opposed
to war as well as proving his individual opposition to war. Under
this test, the individual's associations were probably given more
weight, while sincere objectors from some of the larger denomi-
nations were excluded.
The Selective Service Act of World \rar II dropped the test
by association, and based the test on the individual's religious train-
ing and belief.54 Contributing to this liberalizatiorf were the protesta-
tions of the imprisoned objectors of Vorld Var. I,,' the outcry
against the hysterical treatment given civil liberties during that
war,: '3 the attempts to have the courts liberalize the naturalization
laws to allow alien conscientious objectors to become citizens,5 7 the
pacifist upsurge of the 1930's, and finally the fact that the Selective
Service Act was passed in time of peace rather than under the
urgency of war already declared. However, the "religious train-
ing and belief" test met with varied application by the courts. The
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Berman v. United States5s held
that the test did not encompass broad philosophical or sociological
beliefs, relying on a dictum from the dissent of Mr. Chief Justice
Hughes in United States v. illacintosh.5 9 The Berman case placed
more emphasis upon the orthodox idea of what should constitute
51. Stats. of Confederate States, 1st Cong., Sess. I c. 31 (1862).
52. Stats. of Confederate States, 1st Cong., Sess. IV c. 4 (1864) ; Daly
and Fitzgerald v. Harris, 33 Ga. 38 (Supp. 1864); Burroughs v. Peyton,
16 Gratt. 470 (Va. 1864).
53. 40 Stat. 78 (1917).
54.. 54 Stat. 889 (1940), 50 U. S. C. A. App. § 305(g) (1950).
55. See Thomas, op. cit. supra note 28, at 183, 197.
56. See Chafee, Freedom of Speech in War Tine, 32 Harv. L. Rev. 932-
936 (1919).
57. See United States v. Macintosh, 283 U. S. 605 (1931) ; Beale v.
United States, 71 F. 2d 737 (8th Cir. 1934) ; Bland v. United States, 42
F. 2d 842 (2d Cir.), rcv'd, 283 U. S. 636 (1930). After World War II, one
attempt was finally successful, Girouard v. United States, 328 U. S. 61 (1946)
(holding that alien conscientious objectors could become citizens as long as
that privilege was granted to naturalized citizens). The statutes have since
been amended, see Pub. L. No. 831, Tit. I § 29, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. (Sept.
23, 1951).
58. 156 F. 2d 377 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 329 U. S. 795 (1946).
59. See 283 U. S. 605, 633 (1931) : "The essence of religion is belief
in relation to God involving duties superior to those arising from any
human relation."
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"religious training and belief" than did the Second Circuit, which
applied a broad philosophical lest.60
The 1948 Act for the first time defined religious training and
belief as "an individual's belief in relation to a Supreme Being in-
volving duties superior to those arising from any human relation,
but ... [as not including] . . . essentially political, sociological or
philosophical views .... 61 'his clause, which is essentially the
dictum of Mr. Chief Justice "Hughes,6 2 is set forth along with an
immediate reference to the Berman case in the Senate report 6 that
accompanied the Selective Service and Training Act of 1948. Thus
it is certain that Congress intended a more restricted test for con-
scientious objectors than under the World War II Act.
The Selective Draft Law Cases decided, in a single cursory
sentence,6 that the "well-recognized sect" provision of the World
War I Act was not an establishment of religion. A clause that
is broader than the test so summarily upheld would merit little
analysis now unless cases since 1917 have added new meaning to
the phrase "establishment of religion."6 McCollum v. Board of
Education66 and Everson v. Board of Education,67 the leading cases
in the field of separation of religion and education, have set such
a standard that "establishment of religion" now means an inci-
dental preferment of one religious body over another, 3 a fact
60. United States v. Badt, 141 F. 2d 845 (2d Cir. 1944), cert. dis-
missed, 328 U. S. 817 (1946) ; United States v. Downer, 135 F. 2d 521 (2d
Cir. 1943). See United States v. Kauten, 133 F. 2d 703, 708 (2d Cir. 1943),
A. Hand, J.: ". . . the content of the term [religion] is found in the history
of the human race and is incapable of compression into a few words. Reli-
gious belief arises from a sense cf the inadequacy of reason as a means of
relating the individual to his fellow-men and to his universe-a sense com-
mon to men in the most primitive and in the most highly civilized societies.
It accepts the aid of logic but refuses to be limited by it. It is a belief finding
expression in a conscience which categorically requires the believer to dis-
regard elementary self-interest and to accept martyrdom in preference to
transgression of its tenets."
61. 62 Stat. 612 (1948),50 U. S. C. A. App. § 456(j) (Supp. 1951).
62. See note 59 supra.
63. Sen. Rep. No. 1268, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1948).
64. 245 U. S. 366, 389 (1917): "And we pass without anything but
statement the proposition that an establishment of religion or an interfer-
ence with the free exercise thereof repugnant to the First Amendment re-
sulted from the exemption clauses of the act to which we at the outset re-
ferred, because we think its unsoundness is too apparent to require us to do
more."
65. U. S. Const. Amend. I: "Congress shall make no law respecting
an establishment of religion....
66. 333 U. S. 203 (1948).
67. 330 U. S. 1 (1947).
68. The current controversy rages over whether the establishment of
religion clause in the First Amendment means that the state may not aid
religious bodies in any form after the McColluin-Everson cases. See Everson
v. Board of Education, 330 U. S. 1, 15 (1947) : "The 'establishment of reli-
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conceded by the most vigorous critics of the McCollurn case.69
Since some religious bodies which constitute a great proportion
of the world's population,'7  as well as some organized churches
which must be included in the Christian cultural group,7 1 do not
ascribe to belief in a Supreme Being,72 the Supreme Being clause
necessarily confers a privileged status upon those religious bodies
which do profess to belief in a Supreme Being-if the clause is
given a strict interpretation.
While the term "Supreme Being" might seem to denote a
personage, it could fairly connote an omnipotent intelligence or
authority.7 3 If the term is given a strict interpretation-as the
Berman case calls for-an establishment of religion in the 1948
Act is certain under the McCollum-Everson rule. This constitu-
tional argument, i.e., establishment of religion, may encounter
serious problems. One, the doubtful standing of the plaintiff to
bring the suit in the McCollum and similar cases on establishment
of religion, 74 would not seem to apply to a less orthodox objector
gion' clause... means at least this: Neither a state nor the Federal Govern-
inent can set up a church. Neither can pass laws which aid one religion, aid
all religions, or prefer one religion over another." Opponents of the McCol-
lium case contend that 'Madison's Memorial and Remonstrance against
Religious Assessments, set out in full in the Everson case, 330 U. S. at 63,
has been substituted for 'the First Amendment. See 14 Law & Contemp.
Prob. 1-169 (1949) ; Waite, Jefferson's "Wall of Separatio": What and
Wheref, 33 Minn. L. Rev. 494 (1949).
69. See Corwin, The Supreme Court as National School Board, 14
Law & Contemp. Prob. 3 (1949) ; Brief for Appellees, p. 20, McCollum v.
Board of Education, 333 U. S. 203 (1948).
70. The following bodies exclude any idea of a Supreme Being in
their dogma: Buddhists, estimated numbers-150,300,000, Information Please
Almanac 631 (1951); see 2 Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics 183
(1910) (discussion of doctrine). Taoists, estimated numbers-50,053,200, In-
formation Please Almanac 631 (1951); see 12 Encyclopaedia of Religion
and Ethics 197-198 (1922) (discussion of doctrine). Jainists (India), esti-
mated numbers-1,250,000, 12 Encyclopaedia Britannica 868 (1951); see 2
Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics 186 (1910) (discussion of doctrine).
71. Unitarians, 59,228 members in 1936, U. S. Dep't of Commerce,
Bureau of Census, 2 Religious Bodies 1616 (1936) ; Society for Ethical
Culture, 2000 members in 1936, U. S. Dep't of Commerce, Bureau of Cen-
sus, 2 Religious Bodies 53 (1936).
72. Unitarian: see 22 Encyclopaedia Britannica 709 (1951). The Uni-
tarian Church has no official creed or dogma, leaving that aspect of reli-
gion to the individual member. Therefore "theists" could properly be mem-
bers of the church, as well as humanists. See Reese, The Meaning of Human-
ism (1945). Ethical Culture Society, 8 Encyclopaedia Britannica 756 (1951);
10 Encyclopaedia Americana 537, 539 (1947).
73. Webster's New International Dictionary (2d Ed., Unabridged
1947).
74. See McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U. S. 203, 233-234 (1948)
(concurring opinion of Jackson, J.). Cf. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268
U. S. 510 (1925). See Corwin, The Supreme Court as National School Board,
14 Law & Contemp. Prob. 3, 5-9 (1949).
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facing a prison term. Secondly, however, conscription acts have
come before the courts when the nation was engaged in war or
going through periods of national emergency, when even a com-
pelling individual interest could not convince a court to find a
conscription act unconstitutional in the face of the nation's great-
est interest-self-preservation. However, since universal military
training is a reality, the decision might come when the nation is
at peace. A possible establishment of religion in the selective serv-
ice act might be subject to a more serious treatment than it once
was given.7 -
III. THE PHILOSOPHICAL-SOCIOLOGICAL
OBJECTOR
Although the present test excludes him," the philosophical-
sociological objector who would be willing to accept a conscientious
objector classification can for practical purposes be treated like
the recognized religious objector.77 The reason recognition is
granted at all is curtly stated by the military: conscientious objec-
tors are a troublesome lot that cannot be bothered with as long
as the number is so small.78 Another similar historical instance
would seem to substantiate this, for it shows-that the privilege was
given only when the luxury could be afforded.7 ' Presumably philo-
sophical and sociological objectors could make themselves as much
a nuisance as their more devout brethren. Probably a better reason
is that since the government must allow the free dissemination of
religious views which outwardly condemn war, it should make
some provision for those who recently accept those views. When
such views are encouraged, indirectly, by exempting religious
bodies from taxation, there is more reason for making the pro-
vision. Granting exemption to the religious objector because his
conscience is subject to a greater compulsion than the philosophical-
sociological objector approaches discrimination between religious
ideas. This discrimination proposes the question: where is the
75. See Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U. S. 366, 389 (1917).
76. See Berman v. United States, 156 F. 2d 377 (9th Cir.4, cert.
denied, 329 U. S. 795 (1946), and notes 58-63 sitpra.
77. Such appears to be the case in England: See Hayes, op. cit. supra
note 28, at 58-64; Pollard, Conscientious Objectors in Great Britain and
the Dominions, 28 J. Soc'y Comp. Leg., 3rd Ser., parts III & IV, 72, 74
(1946).
78. 1 Hearings before Senate Military Affairs Committee on Sen. 315,
78th Cong., 1st Sess. 22-24 (1943).
79. See note 52 supra.
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dividing line between religion and philosophy, even philosophy
and politics? Unless the question can be answered, intellectual
honesty requires a liberalization of the present test.
IV. THE POLITICAL OBJECTOR
The political objector must be carefully distinguished from the
conscientious objector, whose status is established by Congress as
exempt from military service. The political objector is of two
types: one consists of participants in an unorganized political move-
ment seeking to outlaw conscription through their martyrdom; the
other includes members of an organized group opposed to the in-
terests of the government. The latter group might best be described
by citing its current example, the American Communist Party.
Because of the elements of sincerity and sedition, the problems
of the latter type are outside the scope of this Note.
The current examples of the objector to war who is a partici-
pant in an unorganized movement consists of those who base their
objection to war on religious grounds. It is abundantly clear that
one may be a political objector and still base his objection on
religious grounds. The "absolutist" objector,"0 who refuses to
register for the conscription process and refuses to recognize any
power in the government to conscript, is such a religious objector
seeking to effect political change. If such an objector writes his
draft board of his intention not to register, inclosing all pertinent
data necessary for registration, he has not fulfilled his duty and is
liable to prosecution,81 though had he registered the conscientious
objector classification would have been easily secured. 2 In England
the absolutist objector who informs the authorities of his refusal to
register will be registered without his consent.8 3 The American
absolutist may be registered if he appears at the draft board stating
his intention not to register,8 4 but if he persists in his position,
80. The term is used in Hayes, op. cit. supra note 28, at 242; also in
I Conscientious Objection 2 (Selective Service System, Special Monograph
No. 11, 1950). 1,624 such persons went to prison in World War II, id. at 117.
81. Cannon v. United States, 181 F. 2d 354 (9th Cir.), cert. denied.
340 U. S. 892 (1950).
82. See Richter v. United States, 181 F. 2d 591, 594 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 340 U. S. 892 (1950). Cf. Cannon v. United States, 181 F. 2d 354
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U. S. 892 (1950).
83. National Service (Armed Forces) Act, 1939, 2 & 3 Geo. 6, c. 81
§5 (7).
84. United States v. Norton, 179 F. 2d 527 (2d Cir. 1950) interpreting
32 Code Fed. Regs. § 1613.16 (1949).
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he will be convicted under some other provision of the Act.& The
legal argument given by the absolutist, that temporal laws cannot
contravene the law of God, or the natural law, to which the con-
stitution must conform, has been rejected by the courts.86 Though
the natural law theory has found some application in other instances
in the past,87 recent decisions indicate that the Court is not likely
to accept it in the near future.""
The Jevovah's Witness seeks political recognition of a differ-
ent sort. Every Johovah's Witness must pledge to proselytize the
teachings of the sect, 9 and all members are termed ministers.
Though Selective Service would certainly grant them the con-
scientious objector classification (I-0),90 which would require
their attendance at civilian work camps, the Jehovah's Witnesses
insist upon the minister of religion classification (IV-D), 91 which
entitles the classificant to complete exemption from military or
civilian service. 2 By a clear misinterpretation of words, 93 the
Jehovah's Witnesses attempt to secure exemption for the propa-
gation of their doctrines, or perhaps for merely selfish reasons."
Since in our time and in the forseeable future, any government
must have the power to wage war to defend itself, those who
fight the political battle to outlaw war must be content with martyr-
dom. Those who seek special advantage for themselves will prob-
ably not be able to call themselves martyrs.
85. United States v. Kime, 188 F. 2d 677 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 20
U. S. L. Week 3089 (U.S. Oct. 8, 1951) (failure to have registration cer-
tificate in possession).
86. See Gara v. United States, 178 F. 2d 38, 40 (6th Cir. 1949), aff'd
per curiam by an equally divided court, 340 U. S. 857 (1950) ; United States
v. Henderson, 180 F. 2d 711, 713-715 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 339 U. S. 963
(1950).
87. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U. S. 45 (1905).
88. See Lincoln Federal Labor Union v. Northwestern Iron & Metal
Co., 335 U. S. 525, 535 (1949) ; Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U. S. 99.
101-103 (1945), 30 Minn. L. Rev. 643 (1946). But see Williams v. Kaiser,
323 U. S. 471, 476 (1945).
89. See Waite, The Debt of Constitutional Law to Jehovah's Witnesses.
28 Minn. L. Rev. 209, 213 (1944).
90. See Klopp v. United States, 148 F. 2d 659 (6th Cir. 1945) ; United
States v. Messersmith, 138 F. 2d 599 (7th Cir. 1943) ; Goodwin v. Rowe,
49 F. Supp. 703 (N.D. W. Va. 1943).
91. 32 Code Fed. Regs. § 1622.19 (1949).
92. 62 Stat. 611 (1948), 50 U. S. C. A. App. § 456(g) (Supp. 1951).
93. See Martin v. United States, 190 F. 2d 775 (4th Cir. 1951). Sen.
Rep. No. 1268, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1948) clearly points out that the
"minister of religion" classification was not intended to apply to all mem-
bers of the Jehovah's Witnesses.
94. United States v. Pitt, 144 F. 2d 169 (3rd Cir. 1944) (bad faith);
Honaker v. United States, 135 F. 2d 613 (4th Cir. 1943) (work in war
plant).
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